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In this paper I make a case for a separate treatment of (singular) anaphoric pronouns 
within a predicate logic with anaphora (PLA).  Discourse representation theoretic 
results (from Kamp 1981) can be formulated in a compositional way, without fid­
dling with orthodox notions of scope and binding. In contrast with its predecessor 
dynamic predicate logic (Groenendijk and Stokhof 1991 ) ,  the system of PLA is a 
proper extension of ordinary predicate logic and it has a genuine update semantics. 
Moreover, in contrast with other compositional reformulations of DRT, the seman­
tics of PLA remains well within the bounds of ordinary, extensional type theory. 
The research for this paper was supported by the ESPRIT Basic Research Project 
6852, DYANA, Dynamic Interpretation of Natural Language. 
Introduction 
In the area of natural language semantics recent years have witnessed an increased 
attention for the inherent dynamics of the process of interpretation and the sub­
sequent development of systems of dynamic semantics . According to the dynamic 
view on meaning, which can be traced back to the work of Stalnaker, "the meaning 
of a sentence does not lie in its truth conditions , but rather in the way it changes 
(the representation of) the information of the interpreter" (Groenendijk and Stokhof 
1991 ) . Among the variety of phenomena that have been the subject of study within 
dynamic semantics, the phenomenon of intersentential anaphora probably has re­
ceived most attention. Also in this paper, the dynamics of interpretation is mainly 
restricted "to that aspect of the meaning of sentences that concerns their poten­
tial to 'pass on' possible antecedents for subsequent anaphors , within and across 
sentence boundaries" .  
Historically, one can distinguish three main types of treatments of (the se­
mantics of) anaphoric relationships .  First of all there is the so-called E-type pronoun 
approach (most prominently, Evans 1985; Heim 1990 ) which has been opposed to 
what has been called the bound variable approach. Among the last , generally con­
ceived of as rooted in the work of Peter Geach, representational (Kamp 1981 ) and 
compositional (Heim 1982 ; Groenendijk and Stokhof 1991 ) approaches have been 
distinguished. The present paper has grown out of the last-mentioned compositional 
tradition, but , as I hope to show, it transcends the distinctions between the three 
types of approach. 
In almost all compositional approaches to anaphora, pronouns are associated with 
(syntactically free, but semantically somehow bound) variables (d. ,  among many 
others, Heim 1982; Barwise 1987; Rooth 1987; Zeevat 1989; Groenendijk and Stokhof 
1991 ;  Chierchia 1992; Pagin and Westersta.hl 1993) . Put in a nutshell, the seman­
tic relationship between pronouns and their antecedents is established in a com­
positional way by associating both with variables, and defining the interpretation 
algorithm as a function updating information about the possible values of these 
variables . Thus, information about the 'value of antecedent terms is available when 
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coindexed pronouns are encountered. 
The main purpose of this paper is to show that the same empirical results 
can be obtained without labelling the subjects introduced by candidate antecedents 
with variables , that is, by not confiating natural language pronouns with a logic's 
variables .  In fact , I will take the lead of natural language syntax, and explicitly dis­
tinguish (anaphoric) pronouns from (bound) variables . In the system of predicate 
logic with anaphora (PLA) which is presented in this paper, anaphoric relation­
ships are accounted for, compositionally, by keeping track of the possible values of 
potential antecedent terms, not of the variables they have been associated with .  
Although, historically speaking, the system of PLA grows out of  the bound 
variable tradition, strictly speaking it departs from that paradigm. In accordance 
with the E-type tradition, ordinary static (truth-conditional) aspects of interpreta­
tion are left untouched. As we will see, the PLA notion of interpretation can also 
be given a representational formulation, as a function updating type-theoretical re­
lation terms . By the distinction between pronouns and variables , basic DRT- and 
DPL-results can be accounted for employing ordinary notions of representation and 
information from extensional, uni-sorted type theory. 
The paper is organized as follows .  As the point of departure I use dynamic predicate 
logic (DPL, Groenendijk and Stokhof 1991 ) ,  the first most perspicuous composi­
tional system of interpretation that models the interpretation of anaphoric relation­
ships.  I will argue that precisely the association of subjects with variables ,  although 
appropriate for the dynamic interpretation of the language of PL itself, needlessly 
complicates matters when it is used to account for anaphora in natural language. 
Section 2 presents the system of PLA, a predicate logic which employs pro­
nouns as an additional category of terms. The interpretation of the language of 
PLA is defined as an update function on a domain of information states , with the 
characteristic feature that existentially quantified formulas introduce subjects to 
information states . These subjects ,  composed of the possible values of candidate 
antecedent terms, are the potential 'referents'  of subsequent anaphoric pronouns . 
Section 3 is devoted to a comparison between PLA, PL and DPL, and very 
concisely addresses the notions of representation and information as they are em­
ployed in DPL, DRT, PLA, and a representational correlate RTA of PLA. 
1 Modeling subjects 
1 . 1  Variables and subjects 
With their inftuential paper 'Dynamic predicate logic' (which has circulated through 
the community since 1987) ,  Groenendijk and Stokhof present a perspicuous refor­
mulation of the semantics of classical predicate logic, which models anaphoric rela­
tionships between pron0!lns and indefinite noun phrases ( 'donkey anaphora' ) . The 
following two examples may serve to illustrate the phenomena dealt with :  
(1 )  A farmer owns a donkey. He beats it . 
(2)  If a farmer owns a donkey he beats it . 
The first of these examples is taken to mean that there is a farmer who owns and 
beats a donkey, and the second that every farmer beats every donkey he owns. These 
examples pose a problem for classical theories of interpretation. In the first place, 
it appears that their meanings must be construed, compositionally, from those of 
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their constituent clauses a farmer owns a donkey , and he beats it ,  respectively. The 
problem is that on no classical analysis there is a non-adhoc way of relating the 
interpretation of the pronouns with that of their antecedents .  The possible farmers 
and donkeys referred back to with the second clause are no recognizable part of the 
truth-conditional or propositional content of the first. Consequently, their interde­
pendence , which is made explicit in our reformulations , is left unaccounted for .  I 
will assume that the reader is familiar with these examples and with the problems 
they pose for canonical ( static) theories of interpretation. 
A dynamic semantics appears to be well suited to deal with the donkey ex­
amples above. In a dynamic semantics , sentences or formulas are not in the first 
place assigned a certain information content of their own; rather, they are inter­
preted relative to information states , and the result of interpreting a formula in an 
information state is always a new, 'updated' ,  information state. The idea is that 
the interpretation of a piece of discourse involves a constant update and adjustment 
of the information which is passed on for the processing of subsequent discourse. 
Clearly, this dynamic perspective upon meaning gives us a handle to deal with the 
donkey examples above. If only, after processing the clause a farmer owns a don­
key , we keep track of the possible farmers and donkeys owned, then we are able to 
interpret subsequent pronouns as referring back to them. 
The DPL system models the interpretation of the above examples by defining 
interpretation as a function updating information about the values of variables .  The 
result of interpreting a farmer owns a donkey is an information state which encodes 
the information that the value of a variable, say x, is a farmer who owns a donkey, 
which is the value of another variable, say y. By matching the pronouns he and 
it in the subsequent clause he beats it with these variables x and y, respectively, 
they can be co-valuated. Consequently, the interpretation of example 1 generates an 
information state which encodes that the value of x also beats y, or, put differently, 
that there is a value of a variable x which owns and beats a donkey which is the 
value of a variable y. 
As its name already suggests ,  DPL in fact gives a dynamic semantics for the lan­
guage of predicate logic. The most significant , and characteristic, fact about DPL 
interpretation is that it licenses the following equivalence, without any restriction 
on free occurrences of variables in 'if;: 
[Scope Theorem] (3x</l " 'if;) {::} 3x(  </I "  'if;) 
In DPL, the semantic scope of an existential quantifier exceeds its syntactic scope: it 
can bind syntactically free variables occurring to the right of it . Thus, it mimicks the 
establishing of anaphoric relationships in natural language. Consider the following 
two intuitively equivalent examples (the first one of which is obviously similar to 
example 1 ) ,  with the associated ( simplified) translations: 
(3)  A man is riding through the park. He is whistling. 
( 3x(Mx " R:c) " Wx) 
(4) A man who is riding through the park is whistling. 
3x« Mx " Rx) " Wx) 
In example 3, the pronoun he in He is whistling is translated with a variable (x 
in the subformula Wx) which occurs free from a syntactic point of view. However, 
the pronoun is preceded by an indefinite term which is translated with a quantifier 
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binding the variable x .  Employing the scope theorem, the free occurrence of the vari­
able appears to be bound by this quantifier semantically, cf. , the (DPL-equivalent ) 
translation under 4. As a result , example 3, under this translation, is interpreted as 
claiming that there is a man who is riding through the park and who is whistling . 
It may be beyond doubt that the semantic relationships between free variables and 
preceding existentially quantified structures in DPL resemble the ones between pro­
nouns and their (indefinite) antecedents in natural language. Still, the DPL inter­
pretation procedure can not , all by itself, be taken to model the establishing of 
anaphoric relationships in natural language interpretation . For ,  this presupposes 
that (occurrences of) natural language pronouns and their antecedents are uniquely 
associated with variables ,  indices , or names,  the possible values of which can be 
kept track of in interpretation. (Similar presuppositions can be found in Heim 1982 ;  
Barwise 1987; Rooth 1987 ;  Chierchia 1992; Dekker 1993 . )  
Here, I proceed upon the assumption that the natural language input t o  
an interpretation algorithm in fact consists of unindexed syntactic structures ,  and ,  
hence , a full DPL-style interpretation procedure capable of  dealing with anaphoric 
relationships must achieve two things : firstly, it must decorate possible antecedents 
and pronouns with indices , and, secondly, it must keep track of their possible val­
ues . Now there is something odd about this way of proceeding. In view of donkey 
anaphora, what we have to account for is the correlation between the interpretation 
of pronouns and that of their antecedents .  On a dynamic account of such anaphoric 
relationships, the possible values of (possible) antecedents must be passed on in the 
process of interpretation. But what is passed on in the DPL model of interpretation 
is not information about the values of possible antecedents ,  but information about 
the values of variables which are associated with potential antecedents .  
The question that suggests itself here i s  whether i t  i s  necessary to do things 
in this , seemingly roundabout way. The aim of this paper is to show that it is not . As 
we will see, it is perfectly possible to relate the interpretation of pronouns and their 
antecedents in a more immediate way, without the intermediary use of variables .  
Moreover, we will see that i t  i s  also profitable to  do  so. 
In the system presented below, I use formulas from a language of predicate logic to 
represent the meanings of simple sentences or sentential clauses of natural language, 
like Groenendijk and Stokhof 1991 do. Furthermore, like in DPL, existentially quan­
tified formulas are used to represent the context change potential of natural language 
indefinites. The difference with DPL is that the subjects introduced by these indef­
inites are not hooked up to the specific variables quantified over. As a consequence , 
(syntactically) free variables can not any longer be taken to refer back to such sub­
jects ,  Le., they no longer serve to represent the semantic contribution of anaphoric 
pronouns. For this reason, pronouns are introduced in this predicate logic language 
as a category of terms of their own. 
It is worthwhile to notice that there is independent motivation for distin­
guishing pronouns from variables ,  like we do in this paper. In the first place , bound 
and anaphoric pronouns are also kept distinct in syntactic frameworks (cf. , for in­
stance, Reinhart 1983) .  In the second place, the two kinds of terms display a different 
semantic behaviour in the scope of modal or epistemic operators (cf. , Groenendijk 
et al. 1994) .  And in the third place, precisely this distinction enables us to keep to 
the ordinary notions of scope and binding. 
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1 . 2 Information about subjects 
In this section, I introduce the minimal notion of information which enables us to 
keep track of subjects which are introduced by indefinite noun phrases and which 
can be taken to be referred back to by pronouns . This notion has developed out 
of the DPL notion of information, and it very closely resembles the one in Dekker 
1993 's EDPL. In DPL and EDPL, the information transmitted in interpretation 
is information about the values of variables , cast in terms of sets of assignments of 
individuals to variables. Here, we will be dealing with information about these values 
themselves , and our information states consists  of the sequences of individuals that 
are the values of variables in (E)DPL. 
The subjects dealt with in this paper correspond to Lewis 1975 's sets of verifying 
'cases ' and to what Fine 1984 calls the 'ranges ' of his 'arbitrary objects ' .  Charac­
teristic feature of our subjects is that they are partial, and interdependent objects. 
Subjects are partial, since their identity need not be absolutely determined . Further­
more, subjects are interdependent,  since the value of one subject , e .g . ,  an arbitrary 
number, may depend on that of another, e .g . ,  an arbitrary higher number. So, al­
though a single arbitrary object corresponds to a set of individuals , a sequence of 
n arbitrary objects corresponds, not to a sequence of n sets of individuals , but to a 
set of n-tuples of individuals, an n-place relation. 
Put more concrete, an arbitrary farmer is modeled as the following set of 
individuals: {d I d is a farmer} . And the set of pairs of individuals { (d, d') I d is 
a farmer and d' a donkey d beats} models an arbitrary farmer and an arbitrary 
donkey he owns. In terms of Lewis 1975, this last set of pairs of individuals is the 
set of cases verifying the clause a farmer and a donkey he owns. 
The information states employed in PLA are formally defined as follows:  
Definition 1 (Information states) 
• sn = p(Dn) is the set of information states about n subjects 
• S = UneN sn is the set of information states 
A state of information about n subjects can be pictured thus : 
! (d} ' . . .  , dn) I (d� , . . .  , d�) 







For a state s E sn and 0 < j :S n, and for any case case e = (d1 , . . .  , dn) E s, dj 
is a possible value of the j-th subject of s, and this value will also be indicated as 
ej . An information state s contains the information that it ' s  first subject is an odd 
number iff all possible values of the first subject are odd numbers , i .e . , iff el is an odd 
number for every case e in s .  Furthermore, such a state s contains the information 
that the i-th subject is a man who owns a donkey which is the j-th subject , iff, for 
every case e in s ,  ei is a man which owns ej , which is a donkey. 
83 
84 Paul Dekker 
With respect to a specific number of subjects the following special types of 
information states are distinguished. The minimal state Tn of information about 
n subjects is nn , the set of all possible n-tuples of individuals. The subjects of a 
minimal information state can have all values . A maximal information state about 
n subjects is {e} for any e = (db . . .  , dn) E nn . A maximal state completely deter­
mines the value of its subjects .  Finally, for any number of subjects n,  the absurd 
information state is the empty set of n-tuples , referred to as .In . An absurd infor­
mation state excludes that its subjects exist . 
On the basis of the present notion of information states , we can also give a 
precise characterization of their subjects :  the set of subjects of a state s is the set of 
projection functions over s. So, for s E S .. , this is the set {f I for some i: 0 < i � n , 
f is the i-th projection function over s} . As we will see, these subject-projection 
functions-serve as the interpretation of pronouns .  
Let us now turn to the relation between information states that models information 
growth. It is useful to establish some notation conventions first : 
Notation Convention 1 
• If e E Dn and e' E nm, then e ·  e' = (el J . . .  , en , e� ,  . . .  , e:") E nn+m 
• e' is an extension of e, e � e' , iff 3e": e' = e ·  e" 
• For s E sn (i E nn) ,  N. ( = Ni) = n, the number of subjects of s (i) 
Information growth comes about, basically, in two ways . It may consist in getting 
more informed about the subjects of an information state, or in getting informed 
about more subjects (or, of course, in a mixture of both ) . The first aspect of in­
formation growth boils down to reducing alternatives , i .e . ,  to eliminating possible 
cases ; the second to extending possible cases . Putting things together, an update of 
a state s is a state that consists ,  only, of extensions of possibilities in 5 :  
Definition 2 (Information update) State s' is an update of  state s,  s � s' , iff 
N. � N." and 'Ve' E s' 3e E s: e � e' 
If s E sn , and if s � s' , then the set of possible values of the first n subjects of s' is 
a subset of that of s. Hence, s' contains more information about its first n subjects 
than 5 does . Moreover s' may contain information about more subjects . 
We can picture the update relation in the following way: 
(d1 , • • .  , d.,) 
(d� ,  . . .  , d�) 
(d�, . . .  , d�) 
If s' is an update of s (s � s') , then all possibilities in s' are extensions of possibilities 
in 5 .  Some possibilities in s, however, need not have an extension in 5' . In what 
follows ,  in case a possibility e E s does have an extension in an update s' of s, I will 
say that e survives in s' ; in case a possibility e E s does not survive in the update 
s', I will say that the update rejects e. 
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Finally, let me point at the following fact : 
Observat ion 1 (S, ::; )  is a partial order 
Quite correctly, information growth is transitive, reflexive and antisymmetric. 
2 Predicate Logic with Anaphora 
In this section I present the system called predicate logic with anaphora. The lan­
guage of this predicate logic is constructed like that of ordinary predicate logic but , 
apart from the categories of (individual) constants and variables,  it employs an ad­
ditional category of anaphoric pronouns as terms. Semantically, the difference with 
ordinary predicate logic is threefold .  First , it is stated as an update semantics . Sec­
ond, existentially quantified formulas are taken to introduce subjects to states , and ,  
third, these subjects are the candidate referents of subsequent pronouns . 
2 . 1  P L A ,  definitions 
The PLA language is constructed from sets of relation constants Rn of arity n, 
from a set C of individual constants ,  and infinite sets V and A = {pi l i E  N} of 
variables and pronouns , respectively. The sets C, V, and A together constitute the 
set of terms T. The indices on pronouns determine which subjects they refer to in 
an information state. 
The formulas of our language are defined as follows :  
Definition 3 (Syntax of PLA) 
The set L of PLA formulas is  the smallest set such that : 
• if t1 ,  • • •  , tn E T and R E Rn, then Rtl . . .  tn E L 
• if tI ,  t2 E T, then tl = t2 E L 
• if if> E L ,  then -,if> E L 
• if if> E L and x E V, then 3xif> E L 
• if if>, 'ljJE L, then (if> I\ t/J) E L  
As usual, Vxif> and if> -> t/J abbreviate -,3x-'if> and -,( if> 1\ -,t/J), respectively. 
In the system of PLA the dynamic interpretation S[if>]M,g of a PLA formula if> in 
an information state s is defined with respect to a model M and an assignment g .  
The parameters M and 9 here are the  ordinary ones from ordinary predicate logic, 
and they behave in the same, static , way. The state parameter s is, as it were , the 
dynamic one. The interpretation of a formula if> in a state s yields an update of 
s ,  and the formula that follows if> will be interpreted in this updated state. The 
interpretation [if>]M,g of a formula if> with respect to M and 9 is a (partial) update 
function on information states . 
A PLA model M = (D,  F) consists of a non-empty domain D of individu­
als, and an interpretation function F whichs assigns individuals in D to individual 
constants and sets of n-tuples of individuals to n-place relation expression. The in­
terpretation of terms is as follows. Constants and variables are evaluated in the usual 
way with respect to a model and an assignment function. Pronouns are evaluated 
relative to an information state s and a case e E s .  In general, terms are evaluated 
relative to four parameters : 
Definition 4 (Interpretation of terms) 
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• [c ]M,.,. ,g = F( c) for all constants c 
• [x ]M,.,e ,g = g( x ) for all variables x 
• [Pi]M,.,e,g = e N, - i  for all pronouns Pi and e and s such that e E s and N. > i 
As has already been said, pronouns refer to subjects in the state of information 
in which they are evaluated. They receive the value assigned by a subject to the 
cases with respect to which the pronouns are interpreted . In the above definition a 
pronoun Pi is mapped onto the i + 1-th last introduced subject of the s tate  s with 
respect to which it is evaluated (if it exists ,  that is; otherwise, the interpretation 
of the pronoun is undefined) .  Clearly, the value which the i + 1-th last introduced 
subject of a state s assigns to a case e E s is eN.-i .  So, the pronoun with the index 
o picks out the subject introduced last , and its value is the last individual of any 
case with respect to which it is evaluated; the pronoun with index 1 picks out the 
forelast mentioned subject , etc. , etc. 
Before we proceed, a comment is in order on definedness and resolvedness .  
Since pronouns may fail a denotation in a state s,  the interpretation of PLA formulas 
will be partial. For instance, if an atomic formula t/J contains a pronoun Pi , then s[t/J] 
will be undefined if N. ::; j .  Undefinedness percolates up in the following way. If 
t/J is undefined for a state s, then so are -'t/J, 3xt/J and t/J /\ 'if;. Furthermore, if 'if; is 
undefined for state s[t/J] , then t/J/\'if; is undefined for s. Notice , that the interpretation 
of a formula 'if; may be partial, since it presupposes the presence of a certain number 
of subjects ,  while the interpretation of a conjunction t/J /\ 'if; is total, that is, when 
t/J involves the introduction of at least that number of subjects .  I will say that a 
pronoun in a discourse is resolved if it refers to a subject introduced in that very 
same discourse. If all the pronouns in a discourse are resolved, and ,  hence, the 
interpretation of the discourse is total, then the discourse itself is called resolved. 
(Notice that defined,ness and resolvedness can also be characterized syntactically. ) 
Let us now turn to the interpretation of PLA formulas (in the first two clauses , if X 
is a set of terms , then Ix is the smallest number greater then or equal to the index 
of every pronoun in X) :  
Definition 5 (Semantics of  PLA) 
• s[Rt1 . . .  tn]M,g = {e E s I ( [t1 ]M,.,e,g , . . .  , [tn]M,.,e,g) E F(R)} (if N. > I{t" . . .  ,t,,} ) 
• S[tl = t2]M,g = {e E s I [t1 ]M,.,e,g = [t2]M,.,e,g} (if N. > I{t" t2 } ) 
• S[-,t/J]M,g = {e E s I -de' : e ::; e' & e' E S[t/J]M,g} 
• S[3Xt/J]M,g = {e' · d i d E D  & e' E S[t/J]M,g[o:/dj} 
• s [t/J /\ 'if;]M,g = S[t/J]M,g['if;]M,g 
where S[Rtl . . .  tn] , s[t1 = t2] , S[...,t/J] E SN" and s[3xt/J] E SN.[4>J +l 
An atomic formula At is evaluated with respect to any case e in the state of informa­
tion s in which interpretation takes place. If such a formula only contains  variables 
and individual constants as terms , its evaluation is in fact independent from these 
cases (and from s). In such a case, slAt] either equals s ,  iff At is classically t rue 
with respect to M and g,  or the absurd state, iff At is classically false with respect 
to M and g.  Only when pronouns come into play the differences between the various 
cases in s may matter. If, for instance, the formula is WPi ( "the i + 1-th last subject 
walks" ) ,  then its interpretation in a state s will involve the elimination of t hose cases 
e in s of which the i + 1-th last element does not walk (in M) .  Put the other way 
around , the result of interpreting that formula in s will result in the state s' , which 
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consists of those cases e E s , the i + I-th last element eN, _i of which does walk ( in 
M) .  
About the other clauses , those dealing with negation, existential quantifica­
tion and conjunction , I will be short here (the clauses are illustrated in more detail 
in the next subsection) .  The interpretation of ""<P in s preserves the cases in s that 
don 't survive the update of s with <P, i .e . ,  the cases that are rejected by that up­
date. The interpretation of an existentially quantified formula 3x<p is a set of cases 
e' extended with an individual d if e' can be found in the update with <P under the 
assignment of d to x . In keeping with the dynamic view on interpretation, sentence 
sequencing, or conjunction, involves the composition of the two update functions 
associated with the conjuncts .  In order to update a state s with <P 1\ 'I/J ,  first s is 
updated with <P and next the result is updated with 'I/J .  
Before turning t o  some illustrations of interpretation in PLA, I give the PLA defi­
nitions of truth, or, rather, support , and entailment : 
Definition 6 (Support and entailment in PLA) 
• s supports <P wrt M and g , s FM,g <P iff 
'Ie E s: 3e' : e ::; e' & e' E S[<p]M,g 
• <PI , . . . , <Pn entail 'I/J, <PI , . . . , <Pn F 'I/J iff 
\fM, g\fs E S: S[<Pl ]M,g . . . [<Pn]M,g FM,g 'I/J (if defined )  
A formula <P is supported by s iff all cases in s survive the update with <p. That i s ,  if 
the interpretation of <P in s s does not reject any case in s. So ,  <P is supported by s if 
s already contains the information conveyed by <P about s 's subjects .  A conclusion 
'I/J follows from a sequence of premises <PI '  . . .  ' <Pn if the state that results from in­
terpreting <PI , . . .  , <Pn , in that order , always supports 'I/J. Like the notion of support , 
this notion of entailment is a dynamic one. As will be shown below, pronouns in the 
conclusion may refer back to subjects introduced in the premises . 
2 . 2  PLA, some illustrations 
The definitions from the preceding section will now be illustrated with some ex­
amples. Here, reference to a model and to an assignment function is suppressed 
whenever convenient . 
Existential quantification As is fairly usual, existentially quantified formulas are 
used to express the semantic contribution of indefinite noun phrases in natural lan­
guage. Following Karttunen we have taken indefinites to ' set up' discourse referents ,  
which may remain available for future anaphoric ( co- )reference. Employing the  ter­
minology developed in section 1, we can say that the quantified formulas associated 
with indefinites introduce subjects to information states . For instance , the sentence 
A man walks , which can be translated as 3x(Mx 1\ Wx) , involves the addition of 
men who walk to the cases in the state with respect to which interpretation takes 
place. 
The interpretation of an existentially quantified formula 3x<p with respect to 
some assignment 9 is  stated in terms of the interpretation of <P with respect to any 
assignment g[x/d) which at most differs from 9 in that it assigns an individual d to 
x .  This is  as usual. What is new, is  that for any such individual d, d gets added to 
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the cases considered possible after interpreting rP with respect to g [:z:/d] .  In order to 
see what this amounts to, consider the following example: 
( 5 )  There is a man.  
s[3:z:M:Z:]g = {e ·  d i e  E s[M:Z:]g[:r/dj } 
= {e ·  d i e  E s & d is a man} ( = s' ) 
The interpretation of this example yields a state consisting of all the cases e E 
s extended with an individual d which is a man. (The witnessess of :z: involved 
in supporting the formula· quantified over. )  The last subject in the resulting state 
(which I will refer to as s' in the following examples ) simply is an arbitrary man . 
According to the definition of support , the sentence There is a man is supported by 
a, non-absurd, state s iff no cases in s get eliminated when interpreting the sentence , 
that is, iff there in fact is a man (in the model ) .  
Notice that , since we distinguish (information about the values of) variables 
from (information about the possible values of) pronouns ,  it is no more than natural 
that we keep to the standard scheme for defining existential quantification. In stan­
dard predicate logic [3:Z:rPIg can be defined as UdED [3zrP]g[:r/dj , and our definition 
can be also be stated as s[3:Z:rP]g = UdED (S[rP]g[:r/dj x {d}) . There are only two dif­
ferences : interpretation is defined relative to information states , and an existential 
quantifier is taken to introduce a subject . 
Anaphoric pronouns Pronouns refer to subjects in the state of information in which 
they are interpreted .  These subjects can be equated with projection functions over 
(the cases in) s , and for each case in s, the value of a pronoun is the individual the 
projection function assigns to that case. Above, I have stipulated that the i-th last 
subject of a state is referred to by the pronoun with index i - 1. So, pronoun Po 
refers to the subject introduced last ,  as in the following example: 
(6) (There is a man . )  He walks .  
s'[Wpo] = {e'  E s '  I the last element of e '  walks} 
= {e . d i e E s & d is a man & d walks} 
The interpretation of this example involves the elimination of all those cases e' E s' 
the last element of which does not walk . The last subject in the resulting state is 
an arbitrary walking man. 
The preceding examples may serve to show how the anaphoric connection 
between a pronoun and its antecedent gets established. In fact , the state that results 
from interpreting There is a man .  He walks in s is identical to the one that results 
from interpreting There is a man who walks in s :  
(7) There i s  a man who walks. 
s[3:z:(Mz 1\ Wz)] = {e · d i e  E s [Mz 1\ WZ]g[z/dj } 
= {e . d i e E s [Mz]g[z/dj [W:Z:]g[z/dj } 
= {e . d i e  E S & d is a man & d walks }  
The examples 5+6 and 7 are supported a by  a non-absurd state s iff in fact there i s  
man who walks .  
Negation The interpretation of ""rP in a state s is  defined in terms of s and the 
interpretation of rP in s .  All cases in s that survive the update with rP are cases that 
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support ¢, and ,  hence , must be taken to be rejected by '¢. For example , consider the 
interpretation of the sentence Nobody knows him in state s ' ,  under its translation 
,3xKxpo : 
(8) (There is a man . ) Nobody knows him. 
s' [,3xKxpo] = {e' E s' I ,3e" : e' ::; e" & e" E s[3xKxPO]M,g} 
= {e' E s' I -dd' :  e' · d' E s [KXPO]M,g[xjd'J } 
= {e' E s' I ,3d': d' knows the last element of e' } 
= {e · d i e  E s & d is a man & , 3d' : d' knows d} 
The last subject in the resulting state is an arbitrary, unknown man. 
Here, I will not discuss the PLA notions of universal quantification and im­
plication, as given by their definition in terms of negation, existential quantification 
and conjunction. For their characteristic properties I have to refer the reader to 
Dekker 1993.  It may suffice to observe here that the donkey implication and the 
universally quantified donkey sentence receive their so-called strong readings. 
Support and entailment As has already been said , the support and entailment 
relation are dynamic. A pronoun in a supported formula may refer to a subject in 
the supporting state ,  and pronouns in entailed formulas may refer back to subjects 
introduced by the premises of the entailment . Consider the state that results from 
interpreting example 8 above. This state supports that , say, John doesn't know him: 
(9)  There is a man.  Nobody knows him. So, John doesn't know him. 
s[3xMxH,3yKypo] F -,Kjpo 
Clearly, and correctly, an arbitrary man nobody knows is not known by anybody. 
The dynamics of the support relation carries over to the entailment relation. Con­
sider one more example: 
( 10 )  If a man comes from Rhodes , he likes pineapple-juice. A man I met yesterday 
comes from Rhodes . So, he likes pineapple-juice. 
3x(Mx 1\ Rx) -+ Lpo , 3x(Mx 1\ Rx) F Lpo 
This concludes our exposition of the system of PLA. The logical properties of the 
entailment relation will be studied in more detail in section 3. 
Anaphoric linking It may be clear from the discussion sofar that DPL's charac­
teristic scope theorem is not valid in PLA, but this does not go to show that PLA 
fails a proper normalization procedure. In PLA, the semantic relationships between 
pronouns and their antecedents can be displayed by bringing them in the scope of 
their antecedents and replacing them by variables bound by these antecedents .  Such 
a substitution of anaphoric pronouns with (bound) variables must be somewhat so­
phisticated, however, since other anaphoric relationships should not get distorted. 
To conclude this section, consider the following two reductions by means 
of which the semantic connection between two pronouns and their antecedents is 
brought to (PL) light : 
( 1 1 )  3x(Mx 1\ 3y(Wy 1\ Gxy)) 1\ IpOPl 
A man courts a widow. He impresses her. 
( 12) 3u(Mu 1\ 3y(Wy 1\ Guy) 1\ Iupo) 
A man courts a widow and impresses her. 
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( 13 )  :3u(Mu /\ :3v(Wv /\ Cuv /\ Iuv))  
A man courts and impresses a widow. 
The reductions preserve truth-conditional content . The reader is referred to the full 
paper for a fully general statement of the reduction of resolved PLA formulas into 
truth-conditionally equivalent PL formulas . 
3 Properties and prospects 
With the system of PLA I have given an account of intersentential anaphoric re­
lationships in which pronouns and (free) variables are explicitly distinguished. As 
I want to argue in this section, this way of dealing with things has a number of 
appealing features : the account is  stated as a proper extension of ordinary predicate 
logic, it fully lacks the unintuitive property of DPL-style systems to license arbitrary 
dumping of subjects,  and its entailment relation appears to be better characteriz­
able. Moreover, as is argued in a little more detail in section 3 .2 ,  the account remains 
properly extensional. 
3 . 1  Characteristic properties 
This first subsection states some observations about the relations between ordinary 
predicate logic (PL) , PLA, and (versions of) DPL. 
PLA and PL Quite unlike DPL, PLA obeys the following ordinary substitution 
law: 
Observation 2 (a-conversion) :3xc/> ¢:> :3y[yjxJc/> if y is free for x in c/> and y does 
not occur free in c/> 
Such a substitution is not allowed in DPL, since, there , it changes the binding 
potential of the quantified formula. As we see here, in PLA the ordinary notions of 
scope and binding apply. 
It is easily observed that PLA behaves in a more classical way than DPL 
not only on this score. The subsystem of PLA without pronouns is fully equivalent 
with classical predicate logic: 
Observation 3 (PL and PLA) For any PL formula c/>: 
PL I=M,9 c/> iff S I=M,9 c/> (for any state s ) 
Something similar does not hold for DPL. 
The last observation may go to show that PLA preserves all the theorems 
from ordinary PL. Of course, PLA generates new theorems,  viz . ,  ones in which 
pronouns occur. Furthermore, given the dynamic nature of the PLA entailment re­
lation, entailments involving pronouns will not automatically pattern with ordinary 
PL inference schemes .  However, as will be illustrated in a little more detail at the 
end of this subsection, also such inference schemes can be preserved by appropriate 
pronoun substitutions. 
The two observations above show that the PLA-system is a proper extension ,  
not modification, of ordinary predicate logic. In this respect , PLA stands on a p ar 
with so-called E-type pronoun approaches ,  claimed advantage of which has always 
been that they keep as much as possible to classical semantics . In the full paper, 
this issue is discussed more extensively. There one may also find a sketch of how one 
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can combine the present treatment of donkey anaphora with a (semantic version of) 
an account of E-type anaphora along the lines of Does 1994 .  
Update semantics It  i s  readily established that interpretation in PLA always pro­
duces information update: 
Observation 4 (Update) 'rIs: s :::; s[¢] (if defined) 
The system of PLA simply models the introduction of subjects (by existentially 
quantified formulas) and the update of information about these subjects (by means 
of pronouns) .  It is fairly obvious that this reflects the natural language practice of 
indefinitely setting up and anaphorically referring back to subjects ,  for as far as that 
can be modeled in an extensional first order theory at all . 
Still, this result is not at all that trivial. For instance, bound variable ap­
proaches to anaphora do not have the update property. In such approaches, only 
one of a number of existential quantifiers binding a variable x can be t aken to ( se­
mantically) bind a (syntactically) free occurrence of x. As a consequence, in such 
approaches , the introduction of a subject as the value of a variable x involves the 
elimination of a subject introduced earlier as the value of x. Put crudely, in a bound 
variable approach unfortunately indexing or translating natural language leads to 
'dumping of subjects ' .  This whole possibility simply does not arise in a PLA-style 
system of interpretation. 
The above observation can be strenghthened in the following way:  
Observation 5 (Registration) For all s ,  e E DN, : 
e E s & {e} F ¢ iff :lei: e :::; e' & e' E s [¢J 
The update of a state s with ¢ contains (only) cases that register ,  Le . ,  extend, the 
cases in s that all by themselves support ¢. For this reason, it is appropriate to 
define support and entailment in the way we did, i .e . , in terms of a state  s and the 
update of s with ¢. In DPL such a definition would have given improper results ,  
precisely because its lack of update and registration. 
As a further pay off, update and registration imply that PLA can be straight­
forwardly extended with the account of epistemic modalities in Groenendijk et al. 
1994. A treatment of epistemic modalities along these lines presupposes an update 
notion of support . For this reason, Groenendijk et al. 1994 have to complicate their 
DPL-style information states , not only with information about the world, but also 
with an additional layer of variables, which enables the formulation of the required 
type of update semantics . No such complications are involved in extending PLA 
with information about the world and with epistemic modalities .  Simply by not 
using variables to label subjects ,  that is, by a mere simplification of the mediating 
notion of information, such complications are not in order . 
PLA entailment Since PLA is a proper extension of ordinary predicate logic with 
(indexed) anaphoric pronouns , deviations from predicate logic inference schemes 
can be characterized in terms of (the indices on) pronoun occurrences . Structural 
inference schemes are preserved modulo appropriate pronoun substitutions which 
preserve induced anaphoric relationships .  To conclude this section I give three ex­
amples . (Again , I have to refer to the full paper for more discussion. )  Firs t ,  however , 
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notice that PLA , like DPL, licenses the deduction theorem (here , and in what fol­
lows , r represents an arbitrary sequence of premises ) :  
Observation 6 (Deduction t heo rem) r ,  4>n F .,p iff r F 4>n -+ 'if; 
Clearly, no anaphoric relationships get distorted when moving from the left-hand 
side of this equivalence to the right-hand side. 
Although it is generally the case in PLA, as it is in DPL, that if T F .,p then 
4>, r F 'if;, still we cannot generally add premises without further ado. For instance , 
3x(Mx A Rx) ( There is a man from Rhodes ) enta.ils Rpo ( He is from Rhodes ) ,  but 
3x(  M x A Rx ) A 3x( M x A Ax) ( There is a m an from Rhodes, and there is a man from 
A thens) does not . Pronouns might have to be substituted to give the right results :  
O bservation 7 (Monotonicity) If r F .,p then r , 4> F .,p '  i f  'if;'  i s  obta.ined by 
replacing every unresolved pronoun Pn in .,p by Pn+IS(<I» 
Here, the substitutions in .,p are required to preserve the anaphoric relationships .  
The PLA enta.ilment relation i s  not unconditionally reflexive either. For in­
stance, 3xGxpo � 3xGxpo since the pronoun in the conclusion does not refer to the 
same subject as the one in the premise. Reflexivity is saved if we ma.ke sure that 
(unresolved) anaphors in the conclusion are matched with those in the premise: 
Observation 8 (Reflexivity) r, 4> F <p' if 4>' is obta.ined from 4> by replacing every 
unresolved pronoun Pn in 4> by Pn+IS(<I» 
So, we do find that 3xGxpo F 3:z:GxPl . 
As a final example I turn to the (non- )transitivity of the PLA notion of 
enta.ilment . The dynamics of the enta.ilment relation only allows for the following 
adjusted form of transitivity: 
Observation 9 (Transitivity) if X can be obta.ined from X by replacing every 
unresolved pronoun Pn in X by an unresolved pronoun Pn-IS(.p) , and if 4> F 'if; and 
.,p F X, then 4> F X 
In the first condition I have deliberately used can: if we cannot obta.in a formula 
X in the way indicated, it is because an unresolved pronoun in X refers back to a 
subject introduced by .,p when concluding X from .,p .  In that case we cannot neglect 
the subjects introduced by .,p ,  and enta.il (a  substitute of) X from 4>. In all other 
cases , there is a substitute X of X such that 4> F .,p and .,p F X imply that 4> F X· 
The above inference schemes already display the two characteristic features of PLA 
deduction. From an existentially quantified premise ( 3xFx )  one may derive a con­
clusion with a pronoun (Fpo) , and in a derivation one has to preserve anaphoric 
links by appropriate pronoun substitutions .  Especially this last feature does induce 
some additional bookkeeping. However, deduction in PLA is not troubled by the use 
and possible reuse of variables to label subjects ,  the aspect of interpretation that 
really complicates deduction in DPL. 
3 . 2  Representation and information 
Both DRT and DPL ar.e examples of a dynamic semantics , and each of the two 
exemplifies one, relatively natural, way of turning a static semantics into a dynamic 
one. In DRT, the interpretation of a sentence is , in the first place, defined in terms 
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of updates of representations.  In DPL it is defined in terms of updates of informa­
tion. The DPL reformulation of DRT is , by and large, motivated by considerations 
concerning compositionality, which, I think, most would agree should be secured if 
it is not really too expensive. However, this compositionality issue is intertwined 
with the issue of representationalism. 
In this paper I will not try to make a point for a representational or non­
representational position. Instead, I will sketch a representation theory for anaphora 
(RTA) which is the representational correlate of PLA. There are two reasons for 
doing so. In the first place it shows that a PLA analysis of anaphoric pronouns 
is not at odds with a representational position. More importantly, it shows that 
an account of anaphoric relationships can be stated within an ordinary extensional 
type-theoretical framework. 
The last result is not trivial. For, DRT's DRS language has an idiosyncratic 
interpretation, and compositional elaborations of DPL-style systems have had to be 
stated in terms non-standard models . 
The purposes of this section are similar to those of M uskens 1994, but some­
what more ambitious. We will see that precisely the distinction between pronouns 
and variables enables us to obtain DRT and DPL results in a composition way in an 
unconstrained extensional type theory with only one basic type, that of individuals . 
PLA interpretation can be defined representation ally as a function 'updating' type­
theoretical relation expressions .  In order to keep the correspondence with the PLA 
semantics as close as possible, I will assume Orey's relational models , together with 
Muskens 1989's analysis of abstraction and application (notice that these are harm­
less assumptions) . Moreover, I will assume that PLA's variables are variables (of 
type e) of the type-theoretical language £ and that the constants of £ are those of 
PLA. Thus , we can assume models M = (D,  F) for £ which are also PLA models . 
In what follows ,  I use O'n to indicate the type of n-ary relation expressions . 
FUrthermore, the following notation conventions will be employed. IT ir is a sequence 
of variables Xl .  . . .  , Xn (all of type e) , then: 
• A( i") = A( Xl ) . . .  (Xn) (of type O'm, for A of type O'n+m ) 
• >"i" B = >"X1 . . .  >"xnB (of type O'n+m , for B of type O'm ) 
• 3i" B = 3X1 . . .  3xnB (of type 0'0 , for B of type 0'0 ) 
Finally, for s of type O'n , I will write Ls for the closure 3ir s (  X"') of s of type 0'0. 
We may now turn to the definition of sn ((if» ) , the representational update of 
a relation term sn of type O'n by if>. The result of this , if defined, will always be a 
relation term of some type O'n+m : 
Definition 7 (RTA) 
• [cl� = c • [xl� = X • [Pil� = Xn-1 (if it exists ) 
• Sn((Rt1 . . .  tm) = >"X'" s(X"') A R( [t1l� , . . .  , [tml� ) 
• Sn((t1 = t2 ») = >"X'" s(i") A [t1 l� = [t2l� 
• sn((..,if» ) = >"i" s(ir ) A "'Ls((if» ) (ir) 
• sn((3yif» ) = >"i"+m>..y s ((if» ) (ir+m) (for s((if» ) of type O'n+m ) 
• sn((if> A t/J» = s((if» ) ((t/J») 
observing appropriate variable conventions 
It is relatively easily established that the RTA update of a representation 
s denotes the PLA update of the denotation of s (here, [al indicates the type-
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theoretical interpretation of 0:) : 
Observation 1 0  ( Soundness of RTA) [s((¢)) ]M,g[./sj = S[¢]M,g 
In short , RTA is the representational correlate of PLA. Here, we come across an 
interesting difference between DRT and DPL on the one hand, and RTA and PLA on 
the other. For, notice that DRT- and DPL-style systems of interpretation somehow 
must assume or guarantee that the domains of interpretation contain some kind of 
correlates of variables ,  or of variable assignments.  Now we can see that , basically by 
not conflating pronouns with variables ,  we can as well account for the semantics of 
natural language anaphoric relationships using ordinary, type-theoretical notions of 
representation and information. 
Let us conclude this section with one potential objection to the enterprise we have 
engaged in here . One might be tempted to think that with the development of an 
RTA or PLA-style semantics we are only pushing our theory to one of the two 
extremes of representationalism and non-representationalism, while a more viable 
or promising alternative might have to be sought somewhere in the middle of the 
two positions. Now I would agree that a comprehensive theory of natural language 
interpretation in the end probably is in need of informational structures in which 
all relevant aspects of representation and information are integrated. However, as , I 
hope, the preceding has shown, the phenomena we have been concerned with here 
appear to have no immediate bearing on such an issue. The syntactic aspects of the 
DPL notion of information, or the semantic idiosyncracies of DRT's DRSs , simply 
are no inalienable ingredient of an account of the semantics of anaphoric links.  
Conclusion 
In this paper I have presented a predicate logic with anaphora. Taking the lead from 
natural language syntax, I have developed a system of predicate logic which does not 
confiate anaphoric pronouns with variables .  Like its predecessor DPL, PLA gives a 
compositional account of intersentential anaphoric relationships dealt with in basic 
DRT. 
In PLA the semantic connections between pronouns and their antecedents 
are accounted for in terms of update of information, not about the possible values 
of the variables associated with these antecedent terms, but about the possible val­
ues of these antecedent terms themselves. This simplified way of doing things has a 
number of advantages . In the first place, it enables us to account for the dynamics of 
establishing anaphoric relationships by means of a proper extension, not modifica­
tion, of ordinary logical systems . In the second place, it avoids certain complications 
which pertain to a DPL-style approach to natural language anaphora. In particular, 
interpretation in PLA does not generate arbitrary downdate of information. 
Last but not least , the system of PLA shows that a compositional treatment 
of the semantics of anaphoric relationships does not enforce upon us an idiosyncratic 
representation language, or some specialized intensional or many-sorted logic. The 
system of PLA and its representational correlate RTA remain well within the bounds 
of ordinary extensional type theory. 
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